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NOTES
THE STATEMENT SOMEONE ELSE MAKES
MAY BE YOUR OWN: PRIMARY LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 10(b) AFTER CENTRAL
BANK
The Supreme Court's elimination of aiding and abetting ac-
tions in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver1 overturned thirty years of federal common law which had
provided private plaintiffs with remedies against secondary par-
ticipants in fraudulent securities transactions. Prior to Central
Bank, investors could recover from secondary actors, such as
lawyers and accountants, who provided only substantial assis-
tance to the primary actor in violation of section 10(b).2 In the
wake of Central Bank, however, investors who suffer loss due to
securities fraud must scramble to find other remedies.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause the
text of [section] 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting ... a
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
511 U.S. 164 (1994).See, e.g., Harmsan v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982) (recognizing
aiding and abetting cause of action under section 10(b) where defendant has knowl-
edge of independent primary wrong and substantially assists in furtherance of that
wrong); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d
1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974) (recognizing aiding and abetting cause of action under
section 10(b) where another person violated securities law and accused "had general
awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that [was] improper, and ...
knowingly and substantially assisted the violation"); Brennan v. Midwestern Life
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (holding that absent clear expres-
sion of contrary legislative intent, courts must be flexible in their application of sec-
tion 10(b) to ensure proper implementation of its purposes and policies), affd, 417
F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
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under [section] 10(b)."3 Nevertheless, the Court expressly rec-
ognized that the absence of aiding and abetting does not mean
that secondary actors are completely free from liability-
secondary actors can potentially still be held liable as primary
violators.4 In response, private plaintiffs have tried to recharac-
terize what were once aiding and abetting violations as primary
violations.
Ultimately, the fundamental question left unanswered by
Central Bank is what actions of secondary actors in Rule 10b-5
violations constitute primary violations. With little guidance to
be found within the Central Bank decision, several lower courts
have struggled to define the boundaries of primary liability.
This Note attempts to determine the limits of primary liabil-
ity. Part I outlines the provisions of the securities laws at issue
in Central Bank. Part II discusses the decision in Central Bank
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Part
III discusses the fundamental distinctions between primary and
secondary liability. Part IV introduces the post-Central Bank
decisions which have addressed the limits of primary liability.
Finally, Part V analyzes the post-Central Bank authority in or-
der to define the primary violation after Central Bank and its ef-
fect on the jurisprudence of securities enforcement under section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
I. OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING PRIOR TO CENTRAL BANK
A. Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
The Securities Act of 1933' (the "Securities Act") and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 19346 (the "Securities Exchange Act"),
3 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
4 See id.
15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(bbbb) (1994 & Supp. 1995). The Securities Act has two basic
objectives: (1) to provide investors with information, financial or otherwise, concern-
ing the sale of securities to the public; and (2) to prohibit fraudulent sales of securi-
ties. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); SEC v. Southwest
Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1980). The scope of the Securities
Act is strictly limited to jurisdiction established through some use of the mails or of
interstate facilities to commit a prohibited act. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(bbbb) (1994 &
Supp. 1995); accord, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 181 F. Supp. 158, 164
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk) (1994 & Supp. 1995). The Securities Exchange Act also
has two fundamental objectives: (1) to provide for full disclosure; and (2) to prevent
fraud in the sales of securities. Id.; see Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.
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enacted in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash and in re-
sponse to widespread abuses in the securities industry, are the
primary federal securities laws dealing with fraud in the pur-
chase and sale of securities. "The [Securities Act] regulates ini-
tial distributions of securities, [while the Securities Exchange
Act] for the most part regulates post-distribution trading."7 Sec-
tion 10(b)8 of the Securities Exchange Act is a "catchall provi-
sion"9 designed to deal with abuses of the securities laws and has
thus been described as the general anti-fraud provision.'0 Rule
10b-5" was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the "SEC") in 1942 under section 1O(b)'s grant of
authority to the SEC to prescribe rules prohibiting any person
from using or employing any manipulative or deceptive device in
7 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 170-71 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975)). The Acts taken together, "'embrace a fundamen-
tal purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of ca-
veat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry.'" Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972) (first alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1994 & Supp. 1995). Section 10(h) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.
Id.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
'0 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171.
" 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1997). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
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connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 2
While neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 provide an ex-
press private remedy," federal courts have implied the existence
of a private right of action for violations of Rule 10b-5.'4 This
private right of action was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,5 where the Court held that
the availability of an express remedy under other sections of the
securities laws did not preclude defrauded investors from main-
taining actions under section 10(b). 16
Consistent with a broad interpretation of the securities laws
and the willingness of the courts to imply a private right of ac-
tion for violations of Rule 10b-5, the courts interpreted the secu-
rities laws to impose liability on secondary actors for aiding and
abetting.
B. Aiding and Abetting and Pre-Central Bank Application
Aiding and abetting imposes liability on secondary parties
who do not directly participate in an alleged wrongdoing, but
12 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1994 & Supp. 1995). Rule 10b-5 is the chief enforcement
mechanism for section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. The substance of Rule
10b-5 was taken from Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. See George M. Duff, Jr., Re-
marks, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793,
885 (1967). The drafters of Rule 10b-5 intended to supplement the SEC's enforce-
ment capacity under section 17(a). See Milton Freeman, Remarks, Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967).See supra notes 8 & 11.
4 Because Congress did not provide investors with an express remedy against
violation of the "catchall" securities provision, the cause of action and its scope were
created by the courts. This private remedy for a violation of Rule 10b-5 was first
implied in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See
Freeman, supra note 12, at 922. For the past 50 years, the federal courts have sus-
tained private actions of investors deceived in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (citing
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)); Affiliated Ute
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1971) (holding section 10(b)
should be read more liberally to provide private right of action).
's 459 U.S. 375 (1983). "The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond
peradventure." Id. at 380.
"1 Id. at 386-87. In so holding, the Court noted that "[tihe effectiveness of the
broad proscription against fraud in [section] 10(b) would be undermined if its scope
were restricted by the existence of an express remedy under [section] 11." Id. at 386.
Nevertheless, the Court expressly reserved the issue of the existence of aider and
abettor liability as the Court had previously done in Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 191-
92 n.7. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 379 n.5.
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who have played a substantial part in the fraudulent activity. 7
Historically, aiding and abetting was used by private plaintiffs
as well as the SEC to bring actions against accountants, lawyers,
and others who assisted in violations of the securities laws. 8
Congress did not expressly provide for aiding and abetting
liability under section 10(b).19 As with the creation of any ex-
press private remedy," the concept of an aiding and abetting se-
curities violation was derived from civil common law and crimi-
nal law doctrines.2' The leading case recognizing secondary
liability for aiding and abetting was Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Insurance Co.22 The Brennan court held Midwestern,
the defendant corporation, liable under Rule 10b-5 for aiding and
abetting the fraudulent scheme of a securities broker." With
knowledge of the fraudulent activity, Midwestern permitted the
activities to continue by failing to report the broker.24 Acknowl-
edging that nothing in the statute or legislative history indicated
congressional intent to impose such liability, the court, relying
on section 876 of the Restatement of Torts,' nonetheless stated
7 See supra note 2.
," See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9 See supra notes 8, 11 & 13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
21 In 1909, Congress enacted a general aiding and abetting statute applicable to
all federal criminal offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. 1995). The statute re-
quires that a defendant, in order to aid and abet another to commit a crime must,
"in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in
something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it suc-
ceed." United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938); accord United States
v. Harris, 441 F.2d 1333, 1336 (10th Cir. 1971) (stating that in order to be liable, one
need not have active stake in crime, but must merely participate).
22 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
23 Id. at 682 (holding that trial would be necessary to determine whether "the
defendant's alleged 'silence and inaction' was sufficient assistance or encouragement
to constitute an aiding and abetting of [the broker's] alleged violation of the statute
and rule").
24 The broker was trading Midwestern stock but was not transferring the stock
to the buyers. See id. at 675. Acting as its own transfer agent, Midwestern received
complaints about this from the purchasers but simply transferred the complaints
back to the broker. See id. These complaints occurred over a lengthy period of time
during which Midwestern had various conversations with the broker concerning this
problem. See id. Allegedly, Midwestern's officers decided not to report the broker
because of fear that this might depress Midwestern's stock price. See id.
25 Section 876 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he ... (b) knows that the other's conduct consti-
tutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement
to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the
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that "general principles of law should continue to guide the de-
velopment of federal common law remedies under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5."26 Thus, the court in Brennan held that an aider
or abettor could be jointly liable for participation in fraudulent
activity even though the participants did not act in concert.27
A number of courts soon followed Brennan.28 While the
standards for the cause of action differed, all eleven federal cir-
cuits had recognized a private cause of action against aiders and
abettors. 29 Prior to Central Bank, courts did not make a manipu-
lative or deceptive act on the part of the aider and abettor a re-
quirement for liability under section 10(b), but rather, required
"an independent, illegal act ... to which the alleged aider and
abettor [could] be attached."" These cases, however, contained
virtually no discussion with respect to this requirement because
once any independent illegal act was found, attention shifted to
the other elements of aiding and abetting."' As such, the cause of
action for aiding and abetting continued to be applied in this
manner until Central Bank.
32
other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
26 Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
27 Id. at 682. Implying liability for aiding and abetting based upon common law
tort principals, in the court's view, was nothing more than a "logical and natural
complement" to the implication of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5, which
was also developed from general principles of tort law. Id. at 680. The court noted:
Such liability was there rested upon the maxim, Ubi jus, ibi remedium-
Where there is a right, there is a remedy. This is the rationale upon which
the Kardon doctrine has been adopted by the court of appeals. Appropriate
general principles of law should continue to guide the development of fed-
eral common law remedies under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. (citations omitted).
'8 See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990); Cleary v.
Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc.,
502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974). See generally Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D.
Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB.
L. REV. 637 (1988) (discussing versions and elements of aiding and abetting action).
29 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
192 n.1 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court, however, had twice re-
served ruling on the issue of the existence of an action for aiding and abetting under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
379 n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976).
3' Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 28, at 669.
3' See id. at 670; see infra note 67 and accompanying text for elements of the
aiding and abetting cause of action.
3' See generally Carrie E. Goodwin, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank Not
Just the End of Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
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II. THE CENTRAL BANK DECISION AND THE PRIVATE SECRUTIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
A. The Central Bank Decision
In 1994, in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver,33 the Supreme Court rejected the existence of secon-
dary liability for aiders and abettors.34 In Central Bank, the
Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued
bonds in 1986 and 1988, secured by landowner assessment liens,
to finance public improvements in a planned development.35
Central Bank served as the indenture trustee for the bond is-
sues.36 Under the indenture, the bonds were to be secured by
landowner assessment liens with an appraised value of at least
160 percent of the bonds' outstanding principal and interest. 7
In 1988, Central Bank received an updated appraisal of the
land securing the 1986 bonds, showing that land values had re-
mained unchanged.8 Upon review of the appraisal, the under-
writer for the bond issue as well as Central Bank's in-house ap-
praiser informed Central Bank that the appraisal did not appear
to be reliable due to recent declines in property values. 8 Central
Bank nevertheless postponed an independent review of the ap-
praisal until after the bonds were issued.40 The bonds were is-
sued in June 1988 and shortly thereafter the Authority defaulted
on the 1988 bonds.4' Upon default, purchasers of the 1988 bonds,
First Interstate et al., brought suit against, among others, Cen-
tral Bank for violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.42  The complaint alleged that Central Bank was
"'secondarily liable under [section] 10(b) for its conduct in aiding
1387 (1995) (discussing aider and abettor liability prior to and following Central
Bank).
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
34 Id. at 191.
- Id. at 167.
: See id.
37 See id. The bond covenants required the developer to give Central Bank evi-





41 See id at 167-68.
4' See id. at 168.
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and abetting the fraud.' 43
While the issue initially presented to the Court was whether
recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement un-
der Rule 10b-5,44 the Court instead decided to address a thresh-
old issue not raised or addressed by the lower courts: "Whether
there is an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting
violations of [section] 10(b) [.],, While acknowledging diffi-
culty in defining the elements of a section 10(b) cause of action
because Congress had not created the private remedy,46 the
Court nonetheless followed a strict textual construction that it
had employed in earlier decisions.47 The Court simply concluded
that because Congress had not used the words "aiding and abet-
ting" in the statute, liability could not extend beyond the scope of
conduct prohibited by the statute.48
The Court also held that "aiding and abetting" was not em-
bodied in the "directly or indirectly" language of section 10(b).49
The Court reasoned that the inclusion of general aiding and
abetting in the federal criminal code'° suggested that Congress
knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability and had simply
" Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs counsel expressly conceded that Central
Bank of Denver had not itself committed a manipulative or deceptive act. See id. at
191.
" See id. at 169. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that
the existence of scienter was a necessary element in establishing a private cause of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
45 See Central Bank, 508 U.S. at 959 (granting certiorari). In fact, the Court did
not even mention the eleven federal circuit court opinions and the other numerous
district court decisions that found aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b).
'6 See id. at 173.
47 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 200-01. But see
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 14 (1995)
(argVng strict textual construction is "intellectually incoherent").
See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. "We reach the uncontroversial conclusion,
accepted even by those courts recognizing a [section] 10(b) aiding and abetting cause
of action, that the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a
[section] 10(b) violation." Id. The Court also observed that " 'litigation under Rule
10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that
which accompanies litigation in general.'" Id. at 189 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)). But cf. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 196
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A policy of respect for consistent judicial and administra-
tive interpretations leaves it to elected representatives to assess settled law and to
evaluate the merits and demerits of changing it.").
49 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176.
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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chosen not to impose it under section 10(b).5
In its opinion, the Supreme Court focused on the basic re-
quirement for section 10(b) liability: a deceptive material mis-
statement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act
on the part of the defendant. 2 The Court recognized that "aiding
and abetting liability extends beyond persons who engage, even
indirectly, in a proscribed activity; aiding and abetting liability
reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at
all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do."" Thus, noting
that aider and abettor liability as it had been previously defined
by the lower courts did not meet the minimum requirements for
liability under section 10(b), the Supreme Court held that a per-
son could not be liable under section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 for merely
aiding a primary violation of the provisions.54
The Supreme Court's elimination of liability for aiding and
abetting abolished approximately thirty years of federal common
law. While, as we will see, this action clearly limited the reach
of private remedies against lawyers and others who provide
services in connection with the offering of securities,55 the deci-
sion also created uncertainty as to the SEC's ability to use aiding
and abetting as a theory of liability. For this reason, the SEC
urged Congress to enact legislation addressing the Central Bank
decision.
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
On December 22, 1995, the U.S. Senate overrode a Presi-
dential veto to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
51 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176-77.
52 See id at 177.
Id. at 176. Underscoring the Court's conclusion was the recognition that aid-
ing and abetting created liability without reliance by the plaintiff on the aider and
abettor's acts, see id. at 180, which was expressly rejected in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224,243 (1988).
, See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 175. The Court noted that section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5 is "'an area that demands certainty and predictability.'" Id. at 188 (quoting
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)). The rules for determining aiding and
abetting had led to ad hoc determination, offering little predictive value to partici-
pants in the securities business. See id. The Court further noted " 'Isluch a shifting
and highly fact-oriented disposition of the issue of who may [be liable for] a damages
claim for violation of Rule 10b-5' is not a 'satisfactory basis for a rule of liability im-
posed on the conduct of business transactions. ' " Id (alterations in original)
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 755).
See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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of 1995 (the "PSLRA")." The PSLRA explicitly grants authority
to the SEC to bring actions for aiding and abetting under the Se-
curities Exchange Act.57 However, the PSLRA limits the SEC's
authority to actions where the aider or abettor knowingly pro-
vides substantial assistance to the primary violator.58
Consequently, the PSLRA's express provision of authority
for the SEC to bring actions for aiding and abetting is, signifi-
cantly, a clear indication by Congress of the approval of the
elimination of the cause of action of aiding and abetting for pri-
vate plaintiffs.59 As a result of Central Bank and the PSLRA, in-
vestors who suffer a loss as a result of securities fraud may seek
a remedy only by alleging a primary violation of section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5. 60
III. PRIMARY V. SECONDARY LIABILITY
An anticipated response to the Central Bank decision was
the attempt to expand the limits of primary liability under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In Central Bank, the Supreme Court
noted:
The absence of [section] 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does
not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are
always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person
or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs
5 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat. 737) (codified in various
sections of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA contains amendments to various sections of the
Securities and Exchange Act. The amendments include both procedural and sub-
stantive changes as well as penalties to deter meritless litigation. See id. § 101. Ad-
ditionally, the amendments provide for safe-harbors for forward looking statements,
see id. § 102, and proportionate liability for defendants who do not commit securities
violations with actual knowledge; see id. § 201.
57 See PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (adding subsection (f) to section 20 of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act). Section 78t(f) provides:
For purposes of any action brought by the Commission ... any person that
knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of
a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this
chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.
Id.
58 See id.
59 See 141 CoNG. REc. S17933, S17937 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Sarbanes) ("This bill, unfortunately, restores only the SEC's ability to go after
aiders and abettors of violations of the securities laws.").
60 See Broady R. Hodder, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and its After-
math: Securities Professionals' Ever-Changing Liabilities, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 343, 357
(1997).
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a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may
be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5 .... In any complex
securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple viola-
tors ....61
While the decision undermined the law that had been cre-
ated under Rule 10b-5, it also raised a number of issues. The
most important question the Court left open was what actions of
secondary actors in Rule 10b-5 violations would be deemed to
constitute primary violations.62 Clearly inviting litigation of this
issue, the decision in Central Bank did not indicate or lend guid-
ance to the specific actions that could be sustained as primary
violations;' and as a result, the lower courts began to address
this issue.64
Prior to Central Bank, the courts had noted differing degrees
of culpability between primary and secondary wrongdoing. This
culpability distinction was, nevertheless, insignificant; because
liability for primary and secondary actors was joint and several,
the courts were not required to distinguish between the two
types of liability.6 Instead, courts focused their attention on the
aider and abettor's state of mind and whether substantial assis-
tance was given to the primary violator.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court stated that the ele-
ments set forth by the Court of Appeals of the section 10(b) aid-
ing and abetting cause of action consisted of: (1) a primary viola-
tion of section 10(b); (2) recklessness by the aider and abettor as
to the existence of the primary violation; and (3) substantial as-
61 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. The dissenting opinion noted: "Indeed, the
Court anticipates that many aiders and abettors will be subject to liability as pri-
mary violators. For example, an accountant, lawyer, or other person making oral or
written misrepresentations (or omissions ...) in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities may be liable for a primary violation of [section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."
Id. at 199 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Commentators have long recognized the unclear limits between primary and
secondary liability. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 103-11 (1981); David S.
Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Par! Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
597, 600 (1972).
63 See Gareth T. Evans & David S. Floyd, Secondary Liability Under Rule 10b-5:
Still Alive and Well After Central Bank, 52 BuS. LAw. 13, 14 (1996).
See id.
See Hodder, supra note 60, at 344.
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sistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor.66
A primary violation for section 10(b), in contrast, is generally
understood to include the following elements: (1) the making by
the defendant of a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) an
intent to manipulate, deceive or defraud (scienter); (3) reliance
by the plaintiff on the defendant's misrepresentation or omis-
sion; (4) causation; and (5) damages.67 Additionally, if the pri-
mary violation is predicated upon the defendant's failure to dis-
close material information, as in an omission case, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant had assumed an affirmative duty
to disclose."
Since Central Bank, plaintiffs have alleged primary liability
against professionals and financial institutions in many contexts
where secondary liability previously applied. Consequently,
courts have grappled with the distinctions between primary and
secondary liability. 9
In any complex securities transaction where fraud has oc-
curred, there are likely to be multiple violators.0 Therefore, any
person or entity, including, among others, a lawyer, accountant,
or bank, employing a manipulative device or making a material
misstatement or an omission on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies, may be liable as a primary violator under Rule
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 168 (citing First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A. v.
Pring, 969 F. 2d 891, 898-903 (10th Cir. 1992)).
6 Prior to Central Bank, it was unclear what minimum level of scienter was re-
quired to sustain a cause of action for aiding and abetting. Although the Supreme
Court has stated that scienter is a necessary element of the cause of action under
section 10(b), see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976), the
Court has nonetheless, on two occasions, declined to issue a decision on the question
of whether a showing of reckless conduct is sufficient to satisfy the scienter re-
quirement, see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1980); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S.
at 193-94; Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1980).
The majority of both district and circuit courts have stated that some level of
recklessness is sufficient to support a cause of action under section 10(b). See, e.g.,
Eisenberg v. Gagon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,
640 F.2d 534, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 U.S. 938 (1982); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th
Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the scienter requirement under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, see Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omis-
sions Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
667 (1991).
68 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 231 (1980).69 See Evans & Floyd, supra note 63, at 14.
70 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
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10b-5 provided all of the requirements for primary liability un-
der Rule 10b-5 are met.
71
IV. POST CENTRAL BANK ANALYSIS
While Central Bank clearly eliminated secondary liability for
securities fraud for private plaintiffs, the Supreme Court did lit-
tle to resolve the confusion surrounding primary liability. As a
result, the lower courts, relying on the Supreme Court's express
statement that secondary actors still may be held primarily li-
able for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,72 have strug-
gled to define the limits of primary liability.73 Not surprisingly,
the lack of Supreme Court guidance has led to some inconsis-
tencies.
The issue of who makes a material misrepresentation is one
of the first issues the courts have been called upon to address.
One of the first significant cases to analyze the Central Bank
decision was In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation.74 In ZZZZ
Best, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant accounting firm,
Ernst & Young, should be held primarily liable for securities
fraud resulting from the firm's involvement in the "creation, re-
view, or issuance" of publicly released fraudulent statements,
despite the fact that Ernst & Young did not itself release the
statements.75 Relying on Central Bank, Ernst & Young moved
for summary adjudication claiming that because the statements
were not released by the firm, the plaintiffs' claims were, at best,
aiding and abetting allegations no longer actionable as violations
of section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. 7' The plaintiffs, however, asserted
that anyone who actively participates in the creation of a mis-
71 See id.
72 See supra text accompanying note 61.
7 See Evans & Floyd, supra note 63, at 14.
7 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
76 Id. at 964. In addition to approximately 13 publicly released statements, in-
cluding press releases, a Form 10-Q quarterly report, and a Form 8-K report, Ernst
& Young prepared a Review Report on interim financial information which con-
sisted of an explanation of the system for preparing interim financial information,
the application of analytical review procedures to financial data, and conducting in-
quiries of persons responsible for financial accounting matters. See id. at 964 n.2.
7' See id. at 965. Ernst & Young contended that Central Bank, " 'eliminate[s]
claims brought against all those alleged to have 'participated' in the primary wrong-
doer's statement but not to have made a statement' to the public directly," id. at 968
(quoting E & Y Supp. Mem. of P's & As, at 9), so that even if Ernst & Young had
reviewed, edited or approved the statements, no liability could attach, see id. at 966.
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representation should be held primarily liable."
The ZZZZ Best court began its analysis by outlining the dis-
tinctions between secondary aiding and abetting liability and
primary liability. 8 The court noted that under the former aiding
and abetting test, there was no requirement that the defendant
actually commit a deceptive act;' 9 however, in order for primary
liability to attach, there must be a deceptive misrepresentation
on the part of the defendant.0 Relying on Central Bank, the
court emphasized that the Supreme Court made it clear that
mere knowing assistance with the underlying fraudulent scheme
is insufficient to support a primary liability claim.81 Rather, the
plaintiff must allege that the defendant's own statements are de-
ceitful .
The court characterized ZZZZ Best as a "close call," but ul-
timately relied on pre-Central Bank authority to find that there
was sufficient evidence to suggest that Ernst & Young's partici-
pation in the third party misrepresentations was "extensive
enough" to attribute these misrepresentations to Ernst & Young
See id. The plaintiffs asserted that Ernst & Young was "actively involved" in
the creation and review of the various financial reports and press releases that were
provided by ZZZZ Best to the public. See id. The plaintiffs contended that Central
Bank had held simply that a secondary actor who merely assisted another in com-
mitting a manipulative or deceptive act was not liable under section 10(b)/Rule 10b-
5. See id.
78 See id. at 967-68.
' See id. The court also noted that in the Ninth Circuit, prior to Central Bank,
the only requirements for aider and abettor liability were an independent primary
wrong, actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the wrong and of the aider and
abettor's role in furthering the wrong, and substantial assistance in furthering the
wrong. See id. at 967 (citations omitted).
80 See id. "[Aliding and abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in
the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do." Cen-
tral Bank, 511 U.S. at 176.
81 See ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 969. The Supreme Court, however, did not
decide the issue of affirmative assistance in a section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 action be-
cause the plaintiffs had not alleged a primary violation of section 10(b). See id. at
969 n.11; ef McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that language in section 10(b) requires positive action), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1463
(1997).
See ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 969 (stating that in absence of "manipulation,"
plaintiffs must prove some other form of deception on part of defendant pursuant to
Rule 10b-5); see also McGann, 95 F.3d at 826 (concluding that in order for account-
ants to be liable for deception under securities laws, "'they must themselves make a
false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know or should know will
reach potential investors'") (quoting Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d
1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 1996)).
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itself.' Quoting SEC v. Seaboard," the court stated that "[a]n
accountant may be liable for direct violation of ... [Rule 10b-51 if
its participation in the misrepresentation is direct and if it
knows or is reckless in not knowing that the facts reported in the
prospectus materially misrepresent the condition of the issuer."'
Similarly, the court relied on In re Union Carbide Corp. Con-
sumer Business Securities Litigation to conclude that if the de-
fendant "fully participate[s] in the fraud," misrepresentations
made by a third party could be attributed to the defendant.87
Interestingly, the ZZZZ Best court noted, in a lengthy foot-
note, that primary liability was not alleged or addressed in Cen-
tral Bank.' Despite the Central Bank plaintiffs concession that
the defendant did not itself commit a deceptive act, the ZZZZ
'3 ZZZZ Best, 865 F. Supp. at 970 ("While this case creates a close call and per-
haps one of first impression, this Court agrees with Plaintiffs' position."). The court
acknowledged that plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence that indicated defen-
dants had prepared or received the public statements. Nevertheless, the court
agreed with the plaintiffs position that there was sufficient evidence from which to
infer that Ernst & Young was "intricately involved" in the creation of these state-
ments. See id. The court inferred that by publicly dispersing a prospectus that
names them, the defendants assumed responsibility for the statements contained
therein, even though they were not directly involved in its preparation. See id.; see
also Alan Goudiss & Steven M. Simpson, Federal and State Securities Law Litiga-
tion: Fundamentals and Recent Developments, PRAC. L. INST. (1997), available in
WESTLAW at 560 PLIILIT 187, 195.
" 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that an accountant may be culpable for
direct breach of securities laws if directly involved in misrepresentation and knows
or is reckless in failing to know that prospectus materially misrepresents state of
issuer).
' ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Seaboard, 677 F.2d at 1312). Although the court conceded, in a footnote,
that the accountants in Seaboard had certified the financial statements, the court
agreed with the Ninth Circuit's statement that adequate proof of participation in
the public statements of others can "cause the statements to be attributed to the
participator." Id. at 970 n.12.
8' 676 F. Supp. 458, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that an independent profes-
sional accounting firm's formulation of misleading forecasts or arrangement of "raw
data" for those formulations can comprise direct involvement in misrepresentation
and lead to primary securities fraud liability).
87 ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970. In Union Carbide, the court held that a fi-
nancial forecast issued by Union Carbide could be attributed to the accountants,
Morgan Stanley, because "Morgan Stanley prepared the financial projections and
fully participated in the fraud...." Id. (citing Union Carbide, 676 F. Supp. at 467-69).
The Union Carbide court stated that "[p]reparation of misleading projections or
provision of the raw data for such projections can constitute direct participation in a
misrepresentation, and lead to primary 10b-5 liability as was held in Seaboard." Un-
ion Carbide, 676 F. Supp. at 468-69.
See ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 969 n.11.
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Best court suggested that a primary liability claim was action-
able. 9 Turning to policy considerations, the court reasoned that
if the securities market relied on certain public misrepresenta-
tions, then "anyone intricately involved in their creation and the
resulting deception should be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5."90
Within weeks of the ZZZZ Best decision, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, in In re Software Toolworks, Inc.,"
without analyzing the issue, concluded in a footnote that an ac-
See id. ("While it might be argued that the Supreme Court could not have ig-
nored the facts of that case and therefore intended to send the message that such
affirmative assistance did not rise to the level of a primary violation, such an infer-
ence will not be made by this Court.").
'0 Id. at 970; accord McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that natural meaning of section 10(b) imposes liability on all whose misrep-
resentations are "reasonably calculated to influence the investing public").
91 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, Montgomery Secs. v. Dannenberg, 116 S.
Ct. 274 (1995). The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the accountant defendants. See In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 38
F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1994).
In Software Toolworks, a producer of software for personal computers con-
ducted a public offering of common stock. See id. at 1082. After the offering, the
market price of the stock steadily declined and approximately 3 months later, Tool-
works announced substantial losses. See id. Several investors initiated a class action
suit alleging that Toolworks, auditor Deloitte & Touche, and underwriters Mont-
gomery Securities and Paine Webber, Inc., had:
(1) falsified audited financial statements by reporting as revenue sales to
manufacturers with whom Toolworks had no binding agreements,
(2) fabricated large consignment sales to meet financial projections, and
(3) lied to the SEC in response to inquiries made before the registration be-
came effective.
Id. Moreover, plaintiffs argued that the prospectus was misleading because it stated
that revenues for Nintendo Software products had remained constant when, in fact,
revenues had dropped within days of the offering due to substantial returns of the
products. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, 3B SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW, §§ 8.26, 9C.08[2] (1997).
With respect to the SEC inquiries, the plaintiffs alleged that Deloitte had vio-
lated section 10(b) by participating in the drafting of two letters sent to the SEC.
See In re Software Toolworks Inc., 38 F.2d at 1090. In response to a draft prospec-
tus, the SEC instructed Toolworks to disclose second quarter financial information.
Toolworks informed the SEC that this information was not available, but did ac-
knowledge to others participating in the offering that some data for the quarter was
available. See id.
A second letter to the SEC stated that it" 'was prepared after extensive review
and discussions with ... Deloitte'" and referred the SEC to two Deloitte partners
for more information. Id. at 1090 n.3 (alteration in original). The plaintiffs alleged
that this letter was false and misleading because a "model agreement attached to
the letter differed materially from the agreements Toolworks actually used. Id. at
1090-91.
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countant's "significant role" in the mere drafting and editing of
an SEC letter containing misrepresentations was sufficient to
support a claim for a primary violation of section 10(b)/Rule 10b-
5.92 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has established a clear proposition
that primary liability of a secondary actor may be based upon
misrepresentations of a third party when the secondary actor's
participation has been sufficient enough such that the third
party misrepresentations are actually attributed to the secon-
dary actor.9" Naturally, what constitutes sufficient participation
is unclear.
The ZZZZ Best court set a standard of "intricate involve-
ment" in the creation of a misrepresentation to satisfy the suffi-
cient participation requirement.94 It is worth noting, however,
that the facts of the ZZZZ Best case are particularly egregious.
Indeed, the representations that ZZZZ Best made were not only
false, but impossible." For instance, ZZZZ Best represented that
2 Id. at 1090 n.3. In holding that the plaintiff had established a cause of action,
the court simply noted, "[diespite Central Bank, we nevertheless consider this issue
because the plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleges that Deloitte is primarily liable un-
der section 10(b) for the SEC letters .... This evidence is sufficient to sustain a pri-
mary cause of action under section 10(b) and, as a result, Central Bank does not ab-
solve Deloitte on these issues." Id.
3 See id.; McGann, 95 F.3d at 828 (concluding that accountants who received,
discussed, and helped draft letters to SEC were potentially primarily liable).
ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970; see supra note 83.
'5 The facts of ZZZZ Best were described in Edward Labaton, The Gatekeepers
are Still Accountable Even After Central Bank and the Contract With America,
PRAC. L. INST. (1996), available in WESTLAW at 958 PLI/CORP 847, 850-52.
According to Mr. Labaton, ZZZZ Best had portrayed itself as a growing business
enjoying rapidly increasing earnings. See id. at 850. The company represented that
its business was derived from residential carpet cleaning and the restoration of
commercial office buildings damaged by fire or water. Most of ZZZZ Best's revenues
were alleged to come from its restoration business which, in actuality, did not exist,
and, therefore, the revenues attributable to the restoration business also did not
exist. See id.
Mr. Labaton states that before the registration statement became effective, the
lawyers and accountants retained by ZZZZ Best knew that:
(1) ZZZZ Best was headed by a twenty-year-old chief executive officer.
(2) ZZZZ Best was reporting phenomenal earnings.
(3) ZZZZ Best claimed a 30% to 40% profit margin on restoration work for
which ZZZZ Best was supposedly bidding at the time.
(4) ZZZZ Best, to cover up for the non-existent restoration work, used
cashiers checks to pay its purported supplier.
(5) The multi-million dollar restoration contracts contained no specific de-
tails or addresses because such information was supposedly secret.
(6) All of the contracts were with one entity, Interstate Appraisal Services,
to which ZZZZ Best was purportedly extending millions of dollars of credit,
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it had a contract to clean 800,000 square feet of carpet in a single
eight story building in San Diego. However, the largest building
in the city while twenty-five stories tall, comprised only 510,000
square feet.9" Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to see
why a court would be reluctant to dismiss claims of aggrieved in-
vestors.
Software Toolworks, however, may signal the Ninth Circuit's
willingness to permit a much looser standard. As compared with
the "intricate involvement" standard announced in ZZZZ Best,
the Software Toolworks court announced a "significant role"
standard.97 In Software Toolworks, the plaintiffs alleged, and the
court allowed to stand, primary liability claims based upon the
defendant's mere participation in the drafting of two letters sent
to the SEC.9" Notably, the court never expressly recognized that
the two letters were actually the representations of a third party
and not of the defendant.99
This trend in the Ninth Circuit toward an expansive reading
in the form of labor, service, and material, while Interstate's credit report,
on file with the accountants, showed Interstate's credit rating to be fifty
dollars.
(7) The accountants were told that Interstate acted on behalf of insurance
companies whose identities were also a secret.
Id. at 851. As lawyers and accountants, the defendants should have questioned
some of these representations. See id. at 850-51.
In addition, the accountants also knew that before the ZZZZ Best statement be-
came effective in November, 1986, the CEO of ZZZZ Best had allowed the attorneys
and accountants to see a "job site." Id. at 851. Mr. Labaton stated that the account-
ants:
were taken on a tour of a high rise office building in Sacramento on a Sun-
day when no one else was in the building. On the tour it was explained to
them that ZZZZ Best had restored the building which had supposedly been
damaged by massive flooding. Of course, there had been no flood and ZZZZ
Best had done no work at the site.
... Prior to taking the tour, [ZZZZ Best's CEO] had the lawyers and ac-
countants sign letter agreements whereby they agreed not to disclose the
address of the supposed job site to any other members of their respective
firms and not to make any follow-up telephone calls to the building owner
or others about any information that had been provided to them. Both the
lawyers and accountants signed those letters.
Id. 96 See id. at 963. "The Chrysler Building in New York contains approximately
1,200,000 square feet of interior space." Labaton, supra note 95, at 852.
9' In re Software Toolworks Inc., 38 F.3d at 1090 n.3 (noting that evidence pre-
sented by plaintiffs illustrated defendant's "significant role" in drafting and editing
letter at issue).
9' See id.
9 See id. at 1090-91.
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of primary liability continued with Employers Insurance of Wau-
sau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett.' Wausau, addressing both at-
torney and accountant liability under section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5,
relied on Software Toolworks and pre-Central Bank authority to
conclude that a secondary actor may be held primarily liable
when the secondary actor's " 'participation in the misrepresen-
tation is direct.' """o Specifically, with respect to accountant li-
ability, the defendant maintained that an accountant may be
held primarily liable only for misrepresentations made in a re-
port certified by the accountant. 1 2 The court disagreed, stating
that "most courts apply a much more flexible test to determine if
an accountant has been sufficiently involved in an offering to be
considered a primary actor .... The defendant accounting firm
in Wausau Insurance, unlike in Software Toolworks, was not
even named in the document containing the misrepresentations.
Nevertheless, the court refused to recognize a "rigid rule that an
accountant must actually be named in a document to be liable as
a primary actor."O'
While the Ninth Circuit has been willing to recognize pri-
mary liability of a secondary actor by attributing misrepresenta-
tions of a third party to the secondary actor, other courts have
refused to impose primary liability for representations that the
defendant does not actually make. These courts have adopted a
bright line rule approach.
In In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholders Litiga-
tion,"' the Eastern District of New York addressed whether third
party statements are actionable as primary liability.' The court
recognized that there appeared to be two distinct approaches:
the Ninth Circuit approach, focusing on the level of participation
100 871 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (considering case remanded by Supreme
Court that resolved circuit split by permitting cause of action for contribution is un-
der section 10(b)).
"" Wausau, 871 F. Supp. at 389 (quoting SEC v. Seaboard, 677 F.2d 1301, 1312
(9th Cir. 1982)).
'0 See id. The complaint alleged that "the attorneys and accountants were the
actual architects of the prospectus and registration statements, and that these
documents contained material misrepresentations and omissions." Id. at 384.
10 Id. at 389.
10 Id. at 389-90.
," 898 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
, See id. at 985. Specifically, the court addressed the question remaining after
Central Bank's elimination of aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and
stated, "where is the line between secondary and primary liability?" Id.
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by the defendant in the misrepresentation; and a bright line rule
approach, dictating that a defendant who did not actually make
the misrepresentation cannot be held liable regardless of the
level of involvement or assistance given.' After considering
both theories, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit approach, pre-
ferring to adopt a bright line rule.0 8 The court stated that "if
Central Bank is to have any real meaning," the defendant itself
must actually make the misrepresentation. °9 "Anything short of
such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability
under Section 10(b)."10
Following MTC Electronic, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit decided Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co."'
Anixter, a securities fraud case that first began in 1973,112 was
the first appellate case to actually analyze the primary liabil-
ity/secondary liability distinctions."' After reviewing the ele-
ments of the respective causes of action,"' the court stated:
The critical element separating primary from aiding and abet-
ting violations is the existence of a representation, either by
statement or omission, made by the defendant, that is relied
upon by the plaintiff. Reliance only on representations made by
others cannot itself form the basis of liability.
1 5
In a footnote, the Anixter court reviewed and rejected the
Ninth Circuit approach, including both Software Toolworks and
ZZZZ Best expressly."' The court stated that permitting claims
to stand based upon misrepresentations made by someone other
than the defendant merely reformulated the "substantial assis-
tance" element of aiding and abetting liability into primary li-
ability and was thus inconsistent with Central Bank."7
107 See id. at 986 (noting that "[ulpon closer scrutiny ... these different ap-
proaches start to blur").
'08 See id. at 987.
109 Id.
110 Id.
1" 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996).
112 Id. at 1218.
"s Id. at 1224.
114 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
15 Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1225 (citing Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994)).
'6 Id. at 1226 n.10.
"1 See id. The court stated, "[tlo the extent these cases allow liability to attach
without requiring a representation to be made by defendant, and reformulate the
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The Anixter court, although conceding that a secondary actor
does not have to communicate a misrepresentation directly to
the plaintiff before primary liability may attach, concluded that,
according to Central Bank, in order for secondary actors to be
held primarily liable under the anti-fraud law, the secondary ac-
tors must themselves make a false or misleading statement (or
omission) that they know or should know will reach potential in-
vestors."8 Interestingly, the court characterized this approach as
"far from a bright line [rule]. " " Nevertheless, by expressly re-
jecting the Ninth Circuit approach, particularly ZZZZ Best,"° the
Tenth Circuit clearly refuses to permit third party misrepresen-
tations to be attributed to a defendant, regardless of the level of
the defendant's involvement in the misrepresentation-a some-
what bright line.
V. ZZZZ BEST REPRESENTS THE BEST APPROACH
Regardless of its wisdom, the Central Bank decision over-
ruled several decades of case law recognizing aiding and abetting
liability in securities fraud."2 Specifically, the Supreme Court
held that the proscription under section 10(b) does not include
giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative act.' As the
Court noted, the problem with aiding and abetting, as it had de-
veloped, was that liability could reach persons who engaged only
indirectly in a proscribed activity.' Thus, in theory, a person
could be held liable for aiding and abetting without actually
committing an affirmative action in furtherance of a fraud.'
'substantial assistance' element of aiding and abetting liability into primary liabil-
ity, they do not comport with Central Bank of Denver." Id.
118 Id. at 1226.
19 Id. at 1227. The court held that rule 10b-5 "provides more guidance to liti-
gants than a rule allowing liability to attach to an accountant or other outside pro-
fessional ...." Id. (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188). The court also noted the
need for "certainty and predictability" for participants in the securities industry. See
id.; see also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188; Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988).
120 See Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1224-27, 1226 n.11. By declining to follow ZZZZ Best,
the Anixter court adopted Central Bank's holding that conduct of many third-party
actors falls outside of the intended scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and indi-
cated that the court should carefully scrutinize the extent to which a defendant
participates in the fraud. Id.
121 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1'2 See id. at 176.
1'2 See id.
124 By analogy to criminal law, liability for aiding and abetting can attach with-
out the requirement of an actus reus. In general, crimes must have two components,
the" 'actus reus,' the physical or external portion of the crime[ ] and the 'mens rea,'
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Arguably, though not expressly characterized as such in
Central Bank, the main flaw with aiding and abetting liability
for securities violations was that secondary actors were held
jointly and severally liable as if they were primarily culpable.i 1
Thus, those persons held responsible for their involvement in a
proscribed activity were equally liable regardless of their re-
spective levels of culpability.
126
This problem can best be illustrated through analogy by ex-
amining the differences between common law criminal accom-
plice and aiding and abetting liabilities. Under criminal law ju-
risprudence, accomplice liability provides that "a person who
does not personally commit a proscribed harm may [nonetheless]
be held accountable for the conduct of [a third] person with
whom he has associated himself." 27 Accomplice liability focuses
on the secondary party's liability for the primary party's acts"
and is derivative in nature.129 Thus, an accomplice is not guilty
of an independent offense of "aiding and abetting," but rather,
"derives his liability from the primary party with whom he has
associated himself."
30
Accomplice liability in criminal law is widely accepted and
the mental feature." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01[A],
at 69 (1995); see LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2 (2d ed. 1986). In criminal
law, "the actus reus of an offense consists of (1) a voluntary act ... ; (2) that causes;
(3) social harm." DRESSLER, supra, § 9.01[A] at 69.
Under aiding and abetting, a person could be held liable without the actus reus:
the making of a material misstatement. Cf United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082,
1086 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that elements of federal crime of aiding and abet-
ting include: "(1) the specific intent to facilitate the commission of crime by another,
(2) 'guilty knowledge' by alleged abettor; (3) commission of the substantive offense
by someone else; and (4) assistance or participation in the commission of the of-
fense").
125 See, e.g., In re Ivan F. Boesky Secs. Litig., 36 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that in light of Supreme Court's ruling in Central Bank, aiders and abettors
can no longer be held jointly and severally liable).
126 See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
127 DRESSLER, supra note 124, § 30.01, at 427. Once it is determined that the ac-
complice has assisted in the harmful conduct, the degree of aid is "immaterial." Id. §
30.04(B)(1), at 437.
128 See id. § 30.02, at 428; Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A
Stud in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323 (1985).
See DRESSLER, supra note 124, § 30.02(B), at 429 ("In criminal law, an ac-
complice is held accountable for the conduct of the primary party because, by inten-
tionally assisting the primary party, the accomplice voluntarily identifies himself
with the other.").
" Id. § 30.02(A)(2), at 428. "An accomplice is a person who, with the requisite
mens rea, assists the primary party in committing an offense." Id. § 30.04(A)(1), at
435.
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has been defended by analogy to agency law. 3' Under agency
principles, a person may be held liable for the actions of another
if he "consent[s] to be bound by the actions of his agent, whom he
vests with authority for this purpose."'32 Once a person is de-
termined to be an accomplice of another, "his identity as a person
subject to criminal punishment is subsumed in that of the pri-
mary party."3' On the other hand, as such, an aider and abettor
is not liable to the same extent as the primary actor."' For ex-
ample, in New York, criminal facilitation, which is analogous to
common law aiding and abetting,'35 varies in classification from a
class B felony to a class A misdemeanor."6 Nevertheless, in all
cases criminal facilitation punishes a lesser level of culpability
than that of the predicate felon, and accordingly, the penalties
for criminal facilitation are always less severe."'
The ZZZZ Best court apparently recognized this difference in
culpability when it emphasized that Central Bank requires a de-
fendant's own statements to be deceitful as opposed to mere
"knowing assistance""' 8 in the underlying fraud where the defen-
dant's own actions were not necessarily deceitful. Yet, the cases
rejecting the ZZZZ Best approach, and perhaps even those cases
adopting ZZZZ Best, have failed to recognize this fundamental
distinction.
Indeed, in In re JWP Inc., Securities Litigation, " 9 decided
1 See id. § 30.02(B), at 428.
1,2 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kadish, supra note 128, at 354).
'- Id. 'The intention to further the acts of another, which creates liability under
the criminal law, may be understood as equivalent to manifesting consent to liabil-
ity under the civil law." Kadish, supra note 128, at 354-55.
124 Cf. Enmond v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding that when accomplice
does not kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill victim, Eighth Amendment does not
permit death penalty to be imposed).
121 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 124, § 6.7(d), at 584 (proposing knowing
assistance as a distinct criminal offense that would provide a "means whereby such
persons, clearly less culpable than those directly participating ... could be subjected
to lesser and different penalties"). New York defines criminal facilitation as
"providing means or opportunity for the commission of a crime by another person.
No 'intent' by the facilitator to commit the prospective crime is required." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 115.00, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1975).
124 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 115.00-115.08 (McKinney 1997).
137 See id. (outlining various degrees of criminal facilitation and their respective
felonr class).In re ZZZZ Best Secs. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 972 (C.D. Cal. 1994). The con-
cept of "Imowing assistance" has developed from criminal law. See LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 124, § 6.7(d), at 582-84.
19 928 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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four months after Anixter, the Southern District of New York
summarized the post-Central Bank case law addressing primary
liability under section 10(b). 4' The court noted that Anixter as
well as MTC Electronic had held that a defendant may not be
held primarily liable unless the defendant actually made a mis-
representation.' Comparing ZZZZ Best and Software Tool-
works, the court also stated that, "[c]ertain courts in the Ninth
Circuit ... have held that a defendant's substantial participation
... in the preparation of misrepresentations that are actually
made by someone else are sufficient to ground primary liability
under [section] 10(b)."' The court, rejecting the stated Ninth
Circuit approach, ultimately held in favor of the defendants,
stating that the defendants did not themselves make the alleged
misrepresentations. '
This distinction from the Ninth Circuit drawn by Anixter
and JWP, Inc. is, however, not necessarily correct. Although
Anixter expressly noted the critical element separating primary
liability from aiding and abetting liability is the existence of a
representation made by the defendant,' the ZZZZ Best ap-
proach is nevertheless entirely consistent with the Anixter
court's interpretation of Central Bank. ZZZZ Best emphasized
that is a threshold to liability.'45 Other courts have failed to rec-
ognize that ZZZZ Best stands for the proposition that although a
defendant may not have made the actual precise fraudulent
statement that the plaintiff relied upon, once the defendant has
engaged in some deceitful act, the defendant may be deemed to
have itself made the relied upon fraudulent statement if that de-
fendant was "intricately involved" in the creation of the fraudu-
14o Id. at 1256.
141 See id.
142 Id. (citations omitted).
"3 See id. In JWP, Inc., the company's independent auditors, among others,
were sued under section 10(b). Id. at 1246. The court noted that the alleged misrep-
resentations that the audit committee defendants made did not include any state-
ments not directly authorized by JWP, Inc.'s Board of Directors. See id. at 1256.
Therefore, the court held that the defendants were "entitled to summary judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs' [section] 10(b) claims to the extent that those claims [weire
based on alleged misrepresentations that the audit committee defendants did not
make."Id.
14 Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996); see
also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
145 See In re ZZZZ Best Secs. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
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lent statement.4 ' Essentially, the ZZZZ Best approach refuses to
absolve a defendant's wrongdoing through the use of semantics
once the defendant has crossed the threshold of deceit.
Additionally, the ZZZZ Best approach is consistent with the
congressional interpretation of the scope of section 10(b). In ar-
guing against the creation of a private cause of action for aiding
and abetting during a debate on the PSLRA Senator D'Amato
stated:
Of course, if someone has knowingly, intentionally[ I misled in-
vestors or been involved in committing fraud, they are no longer
just aiders and abettors, and can be held liable for their actions.
... [Pleople who commit fraud will be treated as primary wrong-
doers, as the culpable party, and can be held jointly and sever-
ally.
147
While not advocating the return of aiding and abetting li-
ability, Senator D'Amato's comments indicate some degree of
congressional recognition of at least some level of involvement in
the commission of a fraud that should potentially lead to liability
as a primary actor.
Accordingly, the ZZZZ Best approach is entirely consistent
with the holding of Central Bank and the intent of Congress.
ZZZZ Best recognizes that there is a threshold level of activity in
which a defendant must engage to be primarily liable under sec-
tion 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. ZZZZ Best holds that this liability is
predicated not on substantial, participation, but rather on a
party's intricate involvement such that a third party's state-
ments are actually attributed to the defendant. This holding is
also entirely consistent with the common law roots of primary
accomplice liability and provides that primary liability attaches
only for primary culpability. Thus, ZZZZ Best represents the
best approach to establishing primary liability after Central
Bank.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's abolition of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity for violations of section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 of the federal secu-
rities laws has forced the federal bench to reassess the contours
146 See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text (discussing ZZZZ Best hold-
ing) 47 141 CONG. REC. S9111 (June 27, 1995) (emphasis added).
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of federal securities fraud violations. One of the major issues
perplexing the courts is whether a secondary actor can be held
primarily liable for a fraudulent misrepresentation actually
made by someone other than that secondary actor. Not surpris-
ingly, courts have taken divergent views in resolving this issue.
In In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation, the Ninth Circuit
held that although a defendant may not make the actual
fraudulent statement relied upon by the plaintiff, once the de-
fendant engages in some deceitful act, the defendant may be
deemed to have made the fraudulent statement if the defendant
was "intricately involved" in the creation of the statement.
148
Other courts, particularly the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., rejected the
ZZZZ Best approach and concluded that permitting claims to
stand based upon misrepresentations actually made by others
was merely a reformulation of the "substantial assistance"
analysis for aiding and abetting liability that the Supreme Court
had been expressly abrogated. 5 '
Nevertheless, Anixter and the other courts decisions that
have rejected the ZZZZ Best approach have failed to recognize
the true fundamental holding of ZZZZ Best. ZZZZ Best recog-
nized that there is first a threshold level of wrongdoing that a
defendant must engage in before being held primarily liable un-
der section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. Once a defendant engages in a de-
ceitful act, and only then, will a defendant potentially be held li-
able for misrepresentations of a third party. The defendant still
must be "intricately involved" in the creation of the misrepresen-
tation before the third party statement will be attributed to the
defendant, leading to primary liability. This holding provides
that primary liability attaches only for primary culpability and,
as such, is consistent with the common law root of accomplice li-
ability.
Even under the ZZZZ Best approach, the Supreme Court's
elimination of the aiding and abetting cause of action will clearly
limit the number of parties that were previously caught under
the net of traditional securities fraud. While this Note does not
address the social impact of the removal of aiding and abetting
liability, at the very least, it does not seem unreasonable that a
"8 ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 967.
"49 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996).
"0 Id. at 1226.
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party's level of liability should equate with his or her level of
culpability: a theory that was absent under the aiding and abet-
ting liability scheme.
One thing is clear: aiding and abetting liability for private
plaintiffs is gone. Before the swell of criticism becomes too great,
it would be prudent to consider a plaintiffs motivation for trying
to hold a "secondary" actor liable in the first instance. Stripping
away the legalese, the motivation for finding secondary actors h-
able is perhaps nothing more than the search for a deep
pocket. 5' This motivation is completely inconsistent with the
fundamental objectives of the securities laws and, as such, the
elimination of aiding and abetting does not seem so unreason-
able after all.
Patricia Blanchini
... See generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Commentary, Why Desimplify?, 108
HARV. L. Q., 727, 745-46 (1995) (discussing defendants' objection to joint and several
liability's unfair financial burden); Joseph A. Grundfest, Desimplifying Private
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority,
107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994) (advocating SEC involvement in Rule 10b-5 debate so
that causes of action with merit can be distinguished from fraudulent claims and
claims based solely on a "deep pocket" theory).
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